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Abstract—In the framework of EUPHEMIA, Minimum In-
come Condition (MIC) orders are supply orders consisting of
several hourly step bids for different market hours, bound
together by the MIC, which formalizes the requirement that
the overall income of the MIC order must cover its given
costs, usually composed by a fixed and a variable term. In
this paper we introduce a so-called flexible orders, which are
also based on the the MIC description, but are composed of
mutually exclusive different production profiles. We define the
computational formulation of this possible new bid type, and
demonstrate the properties of the bid acceptance in the case
of two simple two-period examples, considering various market
clearing prices (MCPs). We argue that this new type of bid
increases the flexibility of day-ahead markets in the presence
of price-uncertainty.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate aim of electricity market reforms in the
European Union (EU) is to create a unified internal market
for electricity, and recently, also to encourage investments in
clean energy technologies [1]. Regarding market integration,
the problems of border effects identified in the previous decade
[2] are still not solved completely, but much progress has
been made. One key topic in the market-unification process is
the integration of day-ahead power exchanges (DAPXs). The
tool called EUPHEMIA [3] has been proposed to perform the
clearing of the all-European electricity market.
In addition, as power generating units – bidding on the
supply side of these markets – based on various technologies
are subject to different technological and economic constraints,
their efficient representation in the power exchanges has
always been a challenging task. In particular, these difficulties
are originating from the non-convex nature of the costs of
power generation [4], such as start-up costs, minimal operating
levels and load gradient constraints. The inclusion of concepts
related to these considerations into the optimization frame-
works of DAPXs is a constant struggle of electricity market
design.
The most fundamental approach to this problem is the
inclusion of block orders [5, 6] with the so-called fill-or-
kill property, limiting their possible acceptance only to the
values of 0 and 1 (potentially also for multiple periods),
without the possibility of partial acceptance. The description
of EUPHEMIA [3] also includes the concept of linked and
exclusive groups of block orders.
Another approach which allows power plants to represent
their fixed (like-start up) and variable (like load-dependent
fuel) costs is the concept of minimum income conditions
(MIC). A MIC order is basically a set of conventional hourly
supply orders with an additional constraint, which ensures that
the resulting allocation of the bids belonging to the order must
cover the predetermined costs. If the MIC condition is not
fulfilled, every bid of the respective order is fully rejected.
Clearing algorithms and efficient formulations for such bids
are discussed in [7–10].
In addition, price uncertainty may be an other issue imply-
ing inefficiencies. As discussed in [11], internalisation of start-
up and other costs based on market expectations in regular
(not MIC) bids may distort the energy offer curve. The paper
[12] analyzes the role of price-uncertainty in the reduction of
efficiency, and compares simple and block bidding to multipart
(MIC-like) bidding. The conclusion of this paper is that even
under optimal simple and block bidding generators face the
risk of ex-post suboptimal solutions, whereas in multi-part
bidding these do not occur, which points to efficiency gains of
multi-part bidding in the presence of uncertainty in electricity
markets. In general it may be said that under price-uncertainty
it is especially desirable to give the generating units more
options for simple and especially complex (multipart) bidding
to, on the one hand, explicitly account for their start-up costs,
and on the other hand, to make their bids more robust against
risks arising from price uncertainties.
In this paper we aim to combine the approach of MIC bids
with the idea of exclusive groups of block orders to introduce
a new type of complex order to increase the flexibility of
portfolio-bidding type European DAPXs.
II. COMPUTATIONAL FORMULATION
To keep the proposed framework as simple as possible, in
the first step we only consider conventional step bids (thus no
ramp-bids or multistep-bids).
The basic idea of the proposed concept is that generating
units may submit so-called flexible orders, which consist of
multiple, mutually exclusive bid profiles, potentially resulting
in different generating schedule regarding time periods as well.
In the later subsections we will demonstrate the principle
on simple 2-period examples.
In the notations introduced in the following, the lower index
corresponds to the period, while the upper index corresponds
to the index of the flexible bid in question and to the index of
the bid profile.
The variables denoted by y stand for the acceptance indica-
tors of single bids: yfi,jp denotes the acceptance indicator of the
bid corresponding to the p-th period of bid profile j defined
in the i-th flexible order (fi in the upper index relates the
indicator to the i-th flexible bid, while the following −j suffix
in the upper index refers to the j-th bid profile). Similarly qfi,jp
and pfi,jp denote the quantity and price of the bid in question.
As we consider supply bids, we assume qfi,jp > 0.
A. Cost model
The cost model of the generating units in question, de-
scribed in eq. (1) is the same as in the case of MIC bids
in [7]:
TCfi = F fi +
∑
j,p
V fip q
fi,j
p y
fi,j
p (1)
where F fi represents the fixed cost component of flexible
order i, which arises if any bid of any submitted production
profile is at least partially accepted (start-up cost), while V fip
denotes the variable cost of production. The lower index p
relates to the consideration that in contrast to the original
MIC concept described in [7], in general we allow for time-
dependence of this constant. The product qfi,jp y
fi,j
p is equal
to the produced amount corresponding to period p of the j-th
bid profile.
B. Profile-exclusivity inequalities
Equation (2) formulates the consideration that the bid pro-
files are exclusive.
yfi,jp ≤ u
fi,j ∀ (i, j)
∑
j
ufi,j ≤ 1 ∀ i (2)
where T is the total number of periods (in our example T = 2),
and ufi,j is a binary variable corresponding to the j-th bid
profile of the flexible order i.
C. Income
Let us denote the income of the bid corresponding to yfi,jp
by Ifi,jp . Intuitively I
fi,j
p may be calculated as
Ifi,jp = MCPp q
fi,j
p y
fi,j
p (3)
where MCPp stands for the market clearing price of energy
in period p.
Equation (3) holds however a quadratic expression of
variables, namely the product of MCPp and y
fi,j
p , which
would result in a computationally demanding quadratically
constrained problem (MIQCP). To overcome this issue, fol-
lowing the methodology proposed in [8] we formulate the
expressions for income as
yfi,jp > 0 → I
fi,j
p = y
fi,j
p q
fi,j
p p
fi,j
p
+ qfi,jp MCPp − q
fi,j
p p
fi,j
p (4)
yfi,jp < 1 → I
fi,j
p = y
fi,j
p q
fi,j
p p
fi,j
p (5)
To elucidate the formulas (4) and (5), let us enumerate the
following three possibilities:
• If the bid is entirely accepted (yfi,jp = 1), I
fi,j
p equals
the product of qfi,jp and MCPp according to (4).
• If the bid is partially accepted (MCPp = p
fi,j
p ), I
fi,j
p
equals to yfi,jp q
fi,j
p p
fi,j
p . Both (4) and (5) are active in
this case and they result in the same inequality.
• If the bid is entirely rejected (yfi,jp = 0), according to
(5) Ifi,jp = 0.
The total income of the bid profile j of the i-th flexible
order may be defined as
Ifi,j =
T∑
p=1
Ifi,jp (6)
D. Minimum income condition
According to the previous assumptions, the minimum in-
come condition may be formulated as
ufi,jp > 0 → I
fi,j ≥ TCfi . (7)
III. EXAMPLE 1
As mentioned earlier, in the first step we assume only step-
bids, the parameters of which are as in Table I.
q
fi,j
p
period 1 2
f1-1 50 40
f1-2 35 50
p
fi,j
p
period 1 2
f1-1 35 40
f1-2 33 42
TABLE I
THE OFFERED AMOUNTS (q
fi,j
p ) AND PRICES (p
fi,j
p ) FOR THE TWO BID
PROFILES IN EXAMPLE 1.
Let us furthermore suppose that the fix cost component of
the generating unit in question is F f1 = 2000, and the variable
costs are V
f1
1
= V f1
2
= 25.
In this case, assuming various MCPs for the two periods,
we may analyze the fulfillment of the MIC condition described
in eq. (7). The results are depicted in Fig. 1.
As it can be seen in this figure, the MCP space may be
partitioned into regions, according to whether the first, the
second, or both profiles meet the MIC criteria.
Theoretically, it is possible that if the MCP is equal to the
offer price, the fulfillment of the MIC condition is dependent
Fig. 1. Fulfilment of MIC conditions in various regions of the MCP space, in
the case of example 1. The dark blue area represents the MCP configurations
when none of the bid profiles meets the MIC condition (so both are rejected).
In the light blue area profile 1, while in the green area profile 2 meets the
MIC criterion. In the yellow area, both profiles meet the MIC.
on the rate of the (potentially partial) acceptance – however
this scenario is not relevant in the case of the proposed
example.
In the first two cases, it is straightforward that the first, or the
second profile may be accepted respectively. In the third case,
when both profiles meet the MIC criteria, the one resulting
in the higher social welfare will be selected by the market
clearing algorithm.
IV. EXAMPLE 2
In our second example we consider ramp bids, and show that
the proposed concept may be generalized also for this case.
Let us note that in this case the inequalities of the income
formulation described in eq. (4) and (5) may not be used, thus
the resulting model will be no more linear.
We assume that the cost parameter of the unit are the same
as before.
Let us suppose the ramp bids depicted in Figs. 2 and 3.
Fig. 2. Ramp bids of bid profile 1. The original step bids are depicted by
dashed lines.
We may consider the same scenarios as in the previous
example. Fig. 4 depicts the regions of the MCP space where
none, one or both profiles fulfill the MIC condition. We can
Fig. 3. Ramp bids of bid profile 2. The original step bids are depicted by
dashed lines.
see in Fig. 4 that the boundaries between the areas are no
more linear.
Fig. 4. Fulfilment of MIC conditions in various regions of the MCP space, in
the case of example 2. The dark blue area represents the MCP configurations
when none of the bid profiles meets the MIC condition. In the light blue area
profile 1, while in the green area profile 2 meets the MIC criterion. In the
yellow area, both profiles meet the MIC.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Flexibility improvement
As it can be seen in Figs 1 and 4, the acceptance region
of the flexible bid (union of the not dark-blue areas) may
be significantly larger compared to either of the single MIC
bids (union of the yellow and the green/light blue areas). This
shows that in the presence of price-uncertainty, flexible pro-
duction bids give an increased probability for the generating
unit to get one of its bid profiles accepted in the market,
thus contribute to an efficient dispatch. As shown in Fig. 4,
this flexibility increases with the application of ramp bids,
compared to the simple step-bid case.
B. Computational issues
Regarding the more simple case when only step bids are
allowed (Example 1), the proposed bid structure and the
implied optimization problem for market clearing may be
implemented in a fully linear framework. Flexible production
bids however increase the number of binary variables. On the
one hand, for every profile j in the flexible bid i induces a
binary variable ufi,j used for the description of the exclusive
nature of the profiles (see eq. (2)), if we have np profiles for
flexible bid this means np binary variables.
The implementation of the implication constraints in the
inequalities of the income (4), (5) also imply 2 np T auxiliary
binary variables used in the big-M constraints.
In addition, for the implementation of the minimum income
condition (7) also np auxiliary binary variables are needed.
All together a flexible bid implies 2 np (T + 1) binary
variables, where np is the number of bid profiles and T is the
number of periods involved. Here for the aim of simplicity we
assumed that every profile is defined for the same periods. This
however, is not a necessary condition for the application of the
proposed framework: profiles may include different periods,
and the concept may be used without any modification – of
course, the number of indicated binary variables may not be
so simply calculated in this case.
In the case of Example 2, the resulting problem will be a
Mixed-Integer Quadratic Program, which is the spectrum of
EUPHEMIA [3].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we introduced a possible new class of complex
bids in day-ahead electricity markets, called flexible order. A
flexible order consists of multiple bid profiles, each may be
viewed as an MIC bid. The resulting MCPs determine the set
of bid profiles which meet the MIC criteria, thus they may be
accepted. If multiple bid profiles turn out to be feasible, the
market clearing algorithm will choose the one resulting in the
highest possible social welfare.
We have shown in the case of simple examples that the
acceptance region of the flexible order (interpreted in the MCP
space) is potentially larger than the acceptance region of any
single MIC bid corresponding to the bid profiles. We argue
that under price-uncertainty the proposed bid type may be a
useful tool for generating units with start-up cost to account for
various MCP outcomes, and increase the flexibility of bidding
in the electricity market.
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